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CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PANEL 
FIDUCIARY EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE WITH A FOCUS 
ON DEFALCATION 
The Honorable Paul W. Bonapfel∗ 
John A. Thomson, Jr.∗∗ 
Richard Thomson∗∗∗ 
Edward R. Philpot (Moderator)∗∗∗∗ 
MS. MOLS: I want to get started on our second panel and introduce our 
moderator, Edward Philpot. Ed is a third-year law student at Emory and is 
executive managing editor of the Journal. As a second-year law student, he led 
the team that authored the Supreme Court cert. petition in the case of Bullock 
v. BankChampaign,1 which is scheduled for oral argument next month. 
A native of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Ed earned undergraduate degrees 
in mathematics and economics, and a master’s degree in economics, all from 
Duke University. Thank you, Ed. 
MR. PHILPOT: Thank you, Yvana. Thank you all for coming today. I’m 
Edward Philpot. Before we get started, I’d like to take this opportunity to 
introduce out panelists. 
Our first panelist is Judge Paul W. Bonapfel. Judge Bonapfel has served as 
a bankruptcy judge for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia since his appointment in 2002. Prior to his appointment, 
Judge Bonapfel represented both debtors and creditors in business and 
consumer bankruptcy cases. 
He is a fellow of the American College of Bankruptcy, and has served as 
the president of the Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute and the chairman of 
the bankruptcy sections of the State Bar of Georgia and of the Atlanta Bar 
Association. Finally, Judge Bonapfel is the co-author of the treatise Chapter 
 
 ∗ United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Georgia 
 ∗∗ Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP 
 ∗∗∗ Clark & Washington, P.C. 
 ∗∗∗∗ Executive Managing Editor, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 
 1 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, vacated and remanded, 133 S.Ct. 
1754 (2013). 
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Thirteen: Practice and Procedure.2 I hope you have brought your copies with 
you, because I know Judge Bonapfel would be happy to autograph them after 
the panel. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Yes, I will. My wife will be happy if you buy some. 
MR. PHILPOT: Our second panelist is Mr. John A. Thomson. Mr. Thomson 
is partner at Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice. He is president-elect of the 
bankruptcy section of the Atlanta Bar Association, secretary of the 
Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute, and he has served as a member of 
several American Bankruptcy Institute Committees, including finance and 
banking, real estate, and asset sales. 
Last, but certainly not least, is Mr. Richard Thomson. Mr. Thomson is a 
partner at Clark & Washington and a fellow of the American College of 
Bankruptcy. He has served as director of the Southeastern Bankruptcy Law 
Institute and is a board member of the bankruptcy section of the Atlanta Bar 
Association. 
Please welcome our panelists. 
This is a very exciting year for Emory Law School, and for four of us who 
had the opportunity to right a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court with the Emory Law School Supreme Court Advocacy 
Project (ELSSCAP). 
I believe that the team is here with us today. There is Scott Forbes, and 
Rachel Erdman, both of whom work on the Journal, Michael Wiseman, and 
me. Mr. Thomas M. Byrne of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, the counsel of 
record, directed and supervised our work all along the way. 
Our research and drafting efforts helped to produce the first successful 
ELSSCAP cert. petition, and put a consumer bankruptcy case before the 
Supreme Court. The argument is two weeks from now, and we’re very excited 
to attend. Of course, we’re wishing Mr. Byrne a lot of luck. 
Emory Law students, through ELSSCAP, are working to provide greater 
access to the Supreme Court for cases of all kinds. And we are working hard to 
establish ELSCAP as the premier Supreme Court advocacy clinic in the 
Eleventh Circuit. At the same time, this project gives students like Scott, 
 
 2 W. HOMER DRAKE JR., PAUL W. BONAPFEL, & ADAM GOODMAN, CHAPTER 13: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE (2013). 
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Rachel, Michael, and me the opportunity to participate in appellate advocacy, 
and experience wins—like with our cert. petition—and losses before the 
nation’s highest court (but we are keeping our fingers crossed). 
The subject of today’s panel will be the area of law that we helped to bring 
before the Supreme Court. Specifically, we will discuss fiduciary exceptions to 
discharge with a focus on defalcation. By way of introduction, here is a brief 
rundown of the facts of the case, the holdings, and the existing law on the 
issue. 
The case revolves around our client, the debtor, Randy Bullock, whose 
father made him the trustee and beneficiary of a trust without his knowledge. 
The sole asset of the trust was his father’s life insurance policy. 
Mr. Bullock learned that he was the trustee of the trust when his father, the 
settlor, approached him and asked him to take a loan against the life insurance 
policy. This is the first of three loans over a period of nine years from 1981 to 
1990. The first loan was to Mr. Bullock’s mother, at his father’s request, so 
that she could pay off a loan to the family business. The second and third loans 
were made jointly to Mr. Bullock and his mother. 
The loans were used to purchase investment interests, real estate, and, later, 
a garage fabrication mill, again, for the family business. At all times the loans, 
totaling about $265,000, were secured by a first mortgage on property that 
appraised for about $447,000. 
Mr. Bullock and his mother made payments on these loans for about fifteen 
years. Notably, the trust document did not clearly prohibit these kinds of 
transactions. 
In 1998, some of the beneficiaries requested that Mr. Bullock resign from 
his position as the trustee, and he did. Mr. Bullock and his mother paid off all 
of the loans within months of his resignation. These payments, with interest, 
totaled about $455,000. The trust was completely whole. 
After Mr. Bullock resigned, BankChampaign was appointed to be the 
successor trustee. 
In 1999, two of the five beneficiaries, Mr. Bullock’s brothers, filed a 
lawsuit against Mr. Bullock in Illinois state court for breach of fiduciary duty. 
In this action, Mr. Bullock’s brothers sought to have any profits earned from 
the loan proceeds turned over to the trust. 
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In 2002, the Illinois court ruled in favor of Mr. Bullock’s brothers, though 
it made no findings of intent other than stating that the debtor did not “appear 
to have had a malicious motive in borrowing funds from the trust.” The court 
held that the loans were self-dealing transactions, and, therefore, breached Mr. 
Bullock’s fiduciary duty under Illinois law. 
The Illinois court awarded $250,000 in damages, and an additional amount 
for attorney’s fees and costs. Also, the court granted BankChampaign a 
constructive trust over Mr. Bullock’s assets, including those purchased with 
the loan money. 
The damages were an estimate of the profits earned with the loan amounts. 
However, the court acknowledged that it would be difficult to know for certain 
what any actual monetary benefit was. 
Despite the Mr. Bullock’s demands, BankChampaign has steadfastly 
refused to liquidate the assets in the constructive trust to satisfy the judgment. 
In 2009, Mr. Bullock filed chapter 7 bankruptcy. BankChampaign initiated 
an adversary proceeding to have the Illinois court damages excepted from 
discharge under § 523(a)(4),3 that is, for fiduciary fraud and defalcation. The 
bankruptcy court applied collateral estoppel. Here, the court held, the Illinois 
court judgment established fraud and defalcation in a fiduciary capacity as a 
matter of law. The entire judgment debt was excepted from discharge. 
The district court affirmed, thought it noted that BankChampaign was 
abusing its position of trust by failing to liquidate the assets. 
Our client appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 
In this case, Mr. Bullock was charged with objective recklessness, because, 
in the court’s opinion, he should have known that his loans were self-dealing 
and, therefore, a breach of fiduciary duty. Mr. Bullock, however, had no legal 
training. The court of appeals did not express an opinion on fiduciary fraud, as 
the defalcation by itself establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(4). The 
court affirmed. 
Defalcation is a creature of federal common law. Courts’ treatment of 
defalcation in a fiduciary capacity appears to require, at a very general level, 
three elements: first, a preexisting fiduciary duty, second, a breach of that 
 
 3 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006). 
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fiduciary duty through, third, some manner of default. We will come back to 
the default later. 
Underlying the three main elements of defalcation is an intent standard. 
Note that defalcation shares the company with the likes of embezzlement, 
larceny, and fraud. There are two main ways to interpret this: one, applying 
noscitur a sociis, that defalcation should have an intent standard similar to 
embezzlement, larceny, and fraud; or, two, applying the canon against 
superfluous language, that defalcation should be distinct from embezzlement, 
larceny, and fraud, and should, therefore, not have a similar intent standard. 
This choice has split the circuit courts. With regard to the intent standard, 
the courts of appeals can be grouped into three camps: one, innocent mistake, 
two, willful neglect or objective recklessness, and three, conscious 
misbehavior and extreme recklessness. 
Under the first standard—innocent mistake—no intent to defraud is 
required to prove a defalcation, only some failure to account. 
The circuits that apply the second standard—willful neglect or objective 
recklessness—require more than mere negligence, but less than fraud. 
Objective recklessness draws on what a reasonable person in the debtor’s shoes 
would have known. For instance, in this case, Mr. Bullock was charged with 
knowledge of the law for a trustee of a trust, though he had no legal training. 
Finally, the circuits that apply the third standard—conscious misbehavior 
or extreme recklessness—have adopted what is essentially scienter from 
securities law as their intent standard. In these circuits, defalcation requires that 
the debtor either embrace an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or 
depart from the standard of ordinary care. 
Courts are also not clear on the nature of the default required for 
defalcation. That is, courts are not unified as to whether the default giving rise 
to a defalcation requires that the beneficiary demonstrate that the trustee 
caused a loss of the trust property—or even that the default was monetary. This 
point is especially elusive because there are not many cases that arise in the 
circumstance when there has not been a loss of trust property. There may be so 
few cases because the beneficiaries had some other remedy available. 
Obviously, all of this raises more unanswered questions. 
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Legislative commissions and courts going back to Judge Learned Hand 
have agreed that “defalcation” is tough to define. Let us see what our panel has 
to say. I think the general rule of exceptions to discharge are in bankruptcy. 
MR. PHILPOT: Judge Bonapfel, what role do the exceptions to discharge 
play in the general scheme of the Code? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Let me start, as I always do, by dodging the question. 
We will incorporate the well-written disclaimer from the first panel, which is 
that we are here, and whatever we say may or may not be our own opinion, and 
certainly does not bind clients or me. And in the words of Judge Barbara 
Houser, who is a bankruptcy judge in Texas, do not cite me to me. Some 
people think that that means that you cannot cite any opinion that I have 
written. You can actually cite an opinion I have written, although my colleague 
Judge Diehl—who is here—will tell you not to cite me to her, even if it is a 
written opinion. 
So, the topic is what are exceptions to discharge, and what role do they play 
in an overall view of the Code. The Code has two primary objectives. The first 
is to provide a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor, and the second 
is to provide for an equitable distribution of the assets of the estate among the 
creditors in accordance with the congressionally established priority. The 
second objective is not what we are here about today. We are here about the 
first, which is the fresh start policy. 
The fresh start policy has two conditions to it. The first is that you have to 
get a discharge and, of course, § 727 specifies a variety of circumstances that if 
a debtor commits certain types of, generally, dishonest, fraudulent types of 
acts, he or she will not receive a discharge. We are not here about that, either. 
This debtor—and we are assuming our debtor gets a discharge—gets over 
the hurdle that requires that he or she not partake in some general level of 
misconduct toward all creditors that makes him or her ineligible for a 
discharge. 
This brings us to the second condition to the fresh start policy. The 
exceptions to discharge exist because there are some types of debts that 
Congress has said that a debtor should not be able to avoid. And so the 
exceptions to discharge in § 523 are a set of types of debts that, for one public 
policy reason or another, Congress said “you cannot avoid those.” You cannot 
get rid of those types of debts. 
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That’s the overall scheme of the discharge ability section, and there are 
nineteen. Right, John? We’re going to use first names because we have two 
Mr. Thomsons, and they’re going to call me by my first name, which I think is 
“Hon.” 
MR. J. THOMSON: The Code sets out nineteen separate enumerated 
exceptions to discharge. Some of them duplicate each other a little bit, but if 
you start reading many of them, that makes sense. When you get your arms 
around it, it is about fairness. 
If you are trying to get a loan, and you tell a lie about the collateral or some 
circumstance surrounding what is going to secure the loan—that is just not fair. 
If you submit a financial statement that is clearly wrong—it has incorrect data 
that would lead somebody to make a loan—that is not fair. But, then, what you 
start to see is Congress—no doubt due to a lot of lobbying by special interest 
groups that have special concerns in the financial area—has inserted some 
exceptions that are getting further down in the weeds. 
Here, Congress is trying to regulate certain specific kinds of conduct. For 
instance, domestic support obligations—no discharge—the same with willful 
injury to property. That is where we are going to be dealing with § 523(a)(4), 
which is fraud or defalcation in a fiduciary capacity. It is unbelievable how 
broad these exceptions can be when you start looking at what is willful injury 
to property—that is another very broad category. 
Then you start getting down into, for instance, student loans, or funds that 
are due back under a federal grant program that must be repaid. Those are 
nondischargeable. Who would have thought, probably at the inception of the 
Act or the Code, that those were going to be specific areas. But some group of 
lenders—the student loan lenders—focused Congress’ attention on that. On 
one hand, in this country we are encouraging people to become better 
educated—we are encouraging people to go out in many respects and get 
technical degrees and borrow money to get them. But, if it does not work out—
if they cannot secure employment—those debts are nondischargeable. 
If you start going down, there are some very specific exceptions for FDIC-
related penalties, and a failure to maintain the capital of a bank. We are going 
to talk further about that. That’s one area that I do a lot of work you, and 
that’s—I believe—an oncoming wave of litigation and claims, and we are 
going to see that further develop. 
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You can go through the nineteen areas, and you can see some very broad 
general characteristics where Congress is trying to make sure that things are—
for lack of better term—fair. But then you really see special interest, special 
exceptions starting to get down in the weeds in terms of what can be excepted. 
MR. PHILPOT: Rich, what impact does excepting a debt like that from 
discharge have on the debtor? 
MR. R. THOMSON: Like anything, when you are talking to a client, you 
have to look at their circumstances, what their goals are, what is driving them 
to file. They may have some very large dischargeable debts and a couple of 
small nondischargeable debts. Getting debtors through and getting rid of the 
dischargeable debts puts them in a position to deal with those nondischargeable 
debts—whether that means a workout with the creditor, or filing a chapter 13 
and paying for them in a subsequent case. 
If a client comes to you, and the major thing that is driving him to file is a 
large nondischargeable debt or potentially large nondischargeable debt, then 
you really have to sit down and do a lot more homework. You also have to 
meet with the client to explain the ins and outs and let him know and help them 
to understand that the relief that he may get may be very limited. 
MR. J. THOMSON: Today in America, probably the closest thing—
unfortunately or fortunately, depending on which side of the rope you are on—
that we have to involuntary servitude is a debt that is out there that does not go 
away. 
You know, having done this for a while, I have been through several 
cycles, and I have contacts greater than when I was a young lawyer starting 
out. Bankers used to tend to say, “well, he doesn’t have anything, he’s 
bankrupt, we’re not going to pursue this, we’re not going to spend legal fees, 
we’re not going spend money to obtain this judgment of nondischargeability.” 
But what they are now seeing, as we go through these cycles, are 
entrepreneurs, developers, they are down, they have done something wrong, 
but they will come back. They will get back into the game. It is in their DNA, 
and this judgment will hang out there, and, eventually—at least from creditor 
side, which is the side that I’m on more often than not—if properly renewed, at 
some point that judgment—if you are diligent—has the opportunity to catch up 
to this debtor. And creditor feels like he has received some recompense for 
what happened. 
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JUDGE BONAPFEL: And the flipside of that—from a policy standpoint—is 
that if you get that huge judgment, that guy is not going to bounce back. Or, if 
he does, he’s going to bounce back in Florida, where they do not have wage 
garnishment. 
MR. PHILPOT: Judge Bonapfel, what do you see as the role of the fiduciary 
exceptions to discharge? To replenish trust property? What do you see as its 
role within the general scheme of the exceptions to discharge? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Well, I am not sure what I see it as, but that is what 
this case is about—the Bullock case—to some extent to define how expansive 
that fiduciary exception is going to be by looking at the definition of 
defalcation. And the basic question in this discussion is, “what is the level of 
intent that is required, if any, in connection with a defalcation by a trustee?” 
The potential impact of this is going to be how broadly this exception is 
going to apply when you are talking about the defalcation aspect of it. Fraud, 
embezzlement, and larceny are other issues that that have their own intent and 
wrongful state of mind requirements, but defalcation could imply an innocent 
or at least an unknowing violation, as the facts of this case—of the Bullock 
case—illustrate. 
So the question becomes, “How broadly is that going to go, and does this 
idea of defalcation expand into other areas of fiduciary relationships that are 
not the type of trust that was involved in this case?” Two areas that readily 
come to mind are attorney-client relationships, which we generally consider to 
be a fiduciary relationship, and the fiduciary relationship of a corporate officer 
or director to either—depending on where you are in the corporation’s life—
the shareholders or the creditors of the corporation. 
So this exception to discharge, § 523(a)(4), could take on either more or 
less significance, depending on how the Supreme Court case rules in this 
matter. 
MR. PHILPOT: Here is a quick question for Rich Thomson, just to follow 
up. We have the facts of just one case before us here today, but what kinds of 
contexts do you see this in consumer practice? 
MR. R. THOMSON: In the consumer practice, the fiduciary relationship 
comes up in probably four different areas. There are federal and state statutes 
that create fiduciary relationships. Generally, for that fiduciary relationship to 
create a nondischargeable debt, the statue has to create a trust at the outset of 
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the relationship and, typically, though, the statute must require a segregation of 
accounts. 
For instance, you will see statutory fiduciary relationships when you are 
dealing with contractors. Different states have different laws, some making it a 
felony for a contractor to take a down payment for supplies or services on a 
particular project and then to use them on a different project. 
For insurance agencies and some insurance agents, some states have laws 
that create a fiduciary obligation regarding premiums paid to the agent, and 
those premiums must be segregated. If those agents do not segregate them, 
then they have violated that fiduciary relationship. 
With landlords, a lot of my clients will have a house that they are renting 
out, and they will not handle their security deposits correctly. Many state and 
federal statutes—especially for government-subsidized rent programs—will 
require that those deposits be placed in a segregated account. 
Also, you will see this frequently with lottery ticket sales. O.C.G.A. 50-7-
214 statutorily creates a trust requiring that the proceeds of lottery ticket sales 
be set aside in a separate account. Failing to account for those sales receipts 
violates the fiduciary relationship. So you have various statutory fiduciary 
relationships. 
Then, you have court-created fiduciary relationships. As Judge Bonapfel 
mentioned, the attorney-client relationship, especially with the attorney escrow 
accounts, those are court-created because the rules of professional conduct are 
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Georgia. 
Often, in divorce decrees, you will see requirements of trusts or money 
being set aside in segregated accounts for the children, for the benefit of the 
ex-spouse, for whatever. And again, that is a court-created fiduciary 
relationship for the spouse that is responsible for creating that account and for 
maintaining it. 
You also have express contractual fiduciary relationships. That is where 
you have the family trust, where you have floor plans with automobile 
dealerships. For instance, when you want to sell American Express money 
orders, you have to agree to an express trust agreement with American 
Express, and you have to set up the segregated account. Gasoline sales 
 
 4 GA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-21 (2012). 
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agreements are much the same thing—you have to segregate the sales proceeds 
in a separate account, and those are done by contract. 
Then, finally, the fourth area is federal common law. The federal common 
law defines what a fiduciary relationship is, and then looks to the state law 
requirements to see if they are met. Federal common law is usually invoked 
when talking about corporate directors, the duty to creditors—that fiduciary 
relationship. It will also sometimes be used to expand purely agency 
relationships, say, where a son has his elderly mother’s power of attorney, and 
they may expand an agency relationship and elevate it to a fiduciary 
relationship where the one party is really incapable of monitoring the other 
party’s behavior. 
Again, whether—in those types of trusts and fiduciary relationships—a 
defalcation results in a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4) is a matter of 
question. Typically, in these § 523(a)(4) trust relationships, you have to have 
an existing trust res, and you have to have specific fiduciary responsibilities 
established at the time that the relationship is created. 
When you are talking and dealing with a lot of consumer debts and you 
say, “Well, Rich, most of those situations that you’re talking about are people 
that are engaged in business.” But a consumer case, typically, the majority of 
their debt is consumer debt versus business debt, and many of our cases are 
people that are self-employed or have little convenience stores, or whatever. 
The majority of these debtors’ debt is consumer debt, because their home 
residential mortgage debts are much greater than their accumulated 
commercial or business debts. 
MR. PHILPOT: Can you expend a little bit on the level of sophistication of 
these individuals? Do they appreciate the fiduciary capacity that they are in—
the relationship that they have with the trust? 
MR. R. THOMSON: Many times they do not. Many times they are not aware, 
especially with the statutory fiduciary relationships. They are not aware that 
they are a fiduciary, and, in fact, the statutes do not require an intention by the 
fiduciary to enter into a fiduciary relationship. Simply, if you are conducting 
this type of business, and are doing this type of activity, then, automatically, 
under the state law or the federal law, you are a trustee and the fiduciary 
relationship is established. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: And the Bullock case is an example, possibly, of an 
apparent lack of sophistication of the debtor, because this is a family situation. 
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The son does not even know that he is a trustee until his father comes and says, 
“Son, you’re the trustee and you need to take out a loan from this trust I set up 
for you and mother,” and that is how it all starts. 
You can see how this developed in the sense of being an innocent 
undertaking by the son, who is asked to do something for his father, and, 
arguably, is just doing some things that the father wants to do. We do not know 
from the facts what happened to the father—it never says that he died. So this 
case, the Bullock case, does establish a primary example, I think, of someone 
who is innocent in the sense of not having any idea that what he is getting 
involved in is going to subject him to some kind of liability. 
MR. PHILPOT: John, can you kind of expand on the corporate context of 
fiduciary exceptions to discharge? 
MR. J. THOMSON: It is, I think, split as you look at the character of the 
corporation that you are talking about. Certainly, the directors that sit on the 
boards of Home Depot, of Delta, of SunTrust Bank, of local, publicly held 
corporations. They are sophisticated businessmen by and large. They 
understand the fiduciary relationship. 
I will tell you, particularly back when the economy was hot—2004, 2005, 
2006—there were people that were being appointed to boards of corporations, 
and to boards of financial institutions, that viewed it as an honor, but perhaps 
did not have the corporate sophistication. 
A brief story. I was in a Publix near my house, and I saw my old football 
coach from high school. And we talked. How you doing? He said, “Listen, I 
gotta run, I’m on the loan committee of a new Bank.” That was the first time 
that it hit me that our economy was sorely overheated. 
We are now seeing those officers and directors, particularly in the FDIC 
financial institutions context, coming in with summons in their hand. They 
have been served with lawsuits, and those are alleging breaches of their 
fiduciary duties to the American taxpayers, essentially, represented by the 
FDIC as conservator for the bank. 
There are other suits that are being brought, for instance, by creditors’ 
committees that are appointed to oversee the liquidation of former public 
companies, where they are, essentially, creditor-derivative actions, asking hard 
questions about some of these officers and directors. “What were you looking 
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at?” “Were you reviewing the financials?” “PWC gave you a qualified opinion 
on your audit—did you take action in response to that qualified audit?” 
There were a lot of people that perhaps did not rise to the level of 
significant corporate sophistication that were serving as officers and directors 
and they are now squarely in peoples’ gun sights. If they go to Rich—if they 
go to any one of the practitioners around town that handle sophisticated 
individual cases—it is going to be interesting to see how that develops—to see 
how those practitioners look at this and respond and give advice that, “Gosh, 
perhaps that liability may be discharged or maybe not, but you may be faced 
with some significant legal expenses, and some significant time and devotion 
to defending this lawsuit.” 
MR. PHILPOT: Is there a difference whether the company is in the zone of 
insolvency? 
MR. J. THOMSON: I think the difference is who is on the other side of the 
table. If the company is not bankrupt, it continues to operate in some way—but 
there has been a defalcation. You may be looking at a shareholder derivative 
suit because of your duty prior to company entering the zone of insolvency. 
The Delaware Chancery Court can’t seem to figure out how to define what that 
is, whether it’s assets and liabilities, ability to meet debts— 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Do you know it when you see it? 
MR. J. THOMSON: You do, sitting where you are. I am not sure that I do. 
And I am not sure that anybody does until you opine on what it’s going to be. 
But in that situation, prior to entering the zone of insolvency, you are looking 
at a shareholder derivative suit. 
After entering the zone of insolvency—particularly if the company finds 
itself in a liquidation scenario in bankruptcy court—you may be looking at the 
creditors committee, and able counsel for that committee, perhaps a lawyer 
retained by that committee, has taken on a contingency fee case, to come and 
prove this § 523(a)(4) exception. 
MR. PHILPOT: Do we see defalcation alleged frequently? Is there a plague 
of defalcation sweeping across the land? Do judgment creditors gravitate 
toward one exception or another? 
MR. R. THOMSON: I do not usually see defalcation alleged very often. 
Typically, they will bring it under fraud, willful misrepresentation, conversion. 
CONSUMER PANEL GALLEYS3 8/1/2013 2:20 PM 
372 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
I have not seen very many defalcation cases and typically they are in the 
lottery ticket sales context. 
MR. PHILPOT: There is a thread of case law out there that suggests that non-
pecuniary breaches of fiduciary duty can give rise to defalcation. Some courts 
have expanded defalcation to include situations where the trust res is merely 
mishandled. Do you have an opinion on whether this should be? 
MR. J. THOMSON: I think this panel may be split a little bit on that. I mean 
the Bullock case, and the Bullock case troubles me. Those loans were repaid 
back to the trust. They were repaid with interest. The trust suffered no net loss. 
Now, what we do not know from the facts of the case—either from the 
underlying decision or from the appellate briefs—we do not know what this 
family looks like. You have two brothers suing another brother over a trust 
when there was no pecuniary loss. Something else is going on there. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: They probably don’t have family picnics too often. 
MR. J. THOMSON: Not anymore. It goes downhill from there. Because then 
you can fan out into a panoply of situations where, for instance, in one case 
there was a trustee who removed her trustee’s fees under an order of the court 
to pay herself prior to the expiration of the thirty day appeal. This is a state 
court proceeding—it was not a bankruptcy court proceeding. It may have been 
a receiver fee. Anyway, she paid herself before the order authorizing her to pay 
herself was non-appealable and final. And, sure enough, somebody came and 
appealed and then she went bankrupt, and in the bankruptcy that party 
appealing came—the fees were already approved, there is no loss. 
So it troubles me where you see situations like this, where people are going 
to be hung out based solely on conduct that resulted in no loss. If you go back 
to first-year torts: duty, breach of duty, and damage. I mean, there are lawsuits 
every day that do not get brought because there are no damages. I think that’s a 
similar context to what we have here. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: And that is where we get into trust law. Because—and 
I’m not a trust lawyer, and some people say I’m not a bankruptcy lawyer 
either—in the law of trusts, there are various duties—and let’s limit this first to 
the express trust that we have here, meaning a contractual document that 
creates a trust. And you have a trustee, you have a res—a certain defined 
property that is to be managed by the trustee—and you have specific 
beneficiaries. This is a classic technical express trust. 
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A trustee has as a number of duties, and a primary duty under trust law is 
the duty of loyalty—loyalty to the principal. And the duty of loyalty means 
you cannot use trust assets for your own benefit. Period. End of discussion. 
Next case. 
Trust guys do not worry about intent or anything else. You cannot self-deal 
unless the trust instrument lets you, and so forth and so on. That is why a lot of 
trust instruments in family situations say, “Yeah, you can make loans to 
family.” But this one didn’t. 
So there is a duty of loyalty. That means no self-dealing. How does the 
trust law look at that? The trust law says that this is applicable non-bankruptcy 
law, which bankruptcy lawyers often do not like to look at. Applicable non-
bankruptcy law generally says that the remedy for self-dealing by a trustee is 
that the trustee cannot keep the profits that are made by dealing with property 
that the trustee is not entitled to deal with. And therefore, if you take one 
hundred thousand dollars from the trust, go buy a lottery ticket, and you win 
and you end up with a million dollars, you owe the trust a million dollars. That 
is the loss, and that is the damage. 
So, in a sense, this is the issue that is being argued before the Supreme 
Court, and I have just stated the position of the creditor, the trust. The other 
argument is that there has to be some actual loss to fit within the congressional 
intent of excepting these types of debt, so that if you do not have a loss, and it 
is a no harm, no foul situation, then the concept of defalcation does not apply 
and there is no exception to discharge to that. 
MR. R. THOMSON: Well, I have a problem with that no harm, no foul 
approach. It reminds me of a recent criminal case that the Eleventh Circuit just 
decided. A chiropractor, a lot of Medicare fraud, hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. He got caught. Before he went to trial, he goes and repays every cent—
hundreds of thousands of dollars. He does about 120 hours of community 
service, goes and speaks at chiropractic schools, works at the local chiropractic 
free clinics, things of that sort. He goes in, and the District Court says, “Wow, 
look at this, you paid all back without me ordering you to, and you’ve done 
this community service, so I’m going to give you a couple days in jail, and put 
you on some probation, and that will be the end of it.” 
Well, it was taken up to the Eleventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit said, 
“Whoa, wait a minute. There is a policy here. What you’ve told this 
chiropractor is that, as long as you pay it back, if you get caught, and you pay 
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it back, everything’s fine. There are no ramifications. So what kind of policy is 
that? We need to send a message that this type of behavior is not acceptable.” 
They reversed and remanded back to the District Court to impose a new 
sentence. 
Similarly, in this defalcation area, this is not “no harm, no foul” because 
there was an unnecessary risk to property that was entrusted to him. And just 
because, “Well, you were lucky enough this time, so you got away with it this 
time, next time when you do something like that, you know, maybe the market 
won’t improve.” Suppose you invested this money in a real estate transaction. 
Well, we all know what happened to the real estate market in the last five 
years. What was over-secured rapidly turned to be under-secured. 
So, there is that policy that you are dealing with the trust of somebody 
else’s property, and, therefore, we are going to hold you to a higher standard, 
and this no harm, no foul thing is not correct. 
Also, in this case, it is my understanding that the brothers did not know 
about the trust at first. In fact, the petitioner did not know about the trust at first 
until the father came to him and said, “Oh hey, by the way, you’re the trustee 
on this million-dollar trust, and I’d like you go borrow some money for your 
mother against the trust for your mother so she can repay back money that she 
owes to my company.” And that was the first loan. Now I’ve just lost my train 
of thought. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Innocence. 
MR. R. THOMSON: Innocence. Oh, but the problem is that the brothers did 
not know about it. When they found out about the trust, and they asked for an 
accounting, that is when the petitioner repaid the money. He resigned and he 
repaid the money. He repaid just enough to cover the interest that would have 
accrued in the trust res, you know, so technically there was not a loss. But 
there was an additional loss because the brothers incurred expenses and 
attorneys fees in validating the trust itself. And so they cannot say no harm, no 
foul. So I think it is appropriate that there was a finding of defalcation in this 
case. 
MR. J. THOMSON: What we are struggling with, and . . . should I say it? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Sure. Just don’t say panoply because if they put this in 
a publication, that is another footnote they are going to have to write for what 
that means. 
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MR. J. THOMSON: Bankruptcy is very specialized discipline. It is hard to 
understand it until you see it in practice. You take the Code and you apply it to 
the financial circumstances and the human circumstances that come before 
you. But the Supreme Court, a lot of time, struggles with bankruptcy issues, 
and we now have a Supreme Court getting ready to rule on something, and 
maybe they will. Maybe we can look forward to some really significant help 
on defining defalcation, because that is what this is going to twist on. 
There was a time in my work where I did a lot of work with bankers’ 
blanket bond policies. And that essentially insures a financial institution 
against misdeeds of their employees—hiding funds, escheating funds, 
anywhere where an employee would set up a scheme where they would 
defraud the bank of money in course of their duties. The definition of 
defalcation in those policies was mind-numbing, and it went through fourteen 
sub-paragraphs, but, at the end of the day, there was no question as to what 
acts of an employee were going to be considered a defalcation—defined 
terms—that would give rise to a loss. 
And what we are struggling with now, and Judge Bonapfel pointed it out at 
the very inception, fraud, larceny, embezzlement, those are defined crimes. It 
is very easy to wrap your arms around what those are. 
What we are struggling with here is, again, the definition of defalcation. Is 
it an innocent mistake? If you are a lawyer and somebody comes to you and 
says, “I need to perfect a security interest, I need to record a document in the 
public record,” whether it is real estate or the UCC records, you are in a 
fiduciary capacity to that client, and things get busy. Your calendaring system 
breaks down in your office. An associate leaves, it does not get filed, and there 
is a defined loss to your client. Is that a defalcation? 
Certainly, you’re trying to be a good lawyer. There’s no intent that that 
mistake was made. There are some cases out there that are drifting in the 
direction of making that a defalcation. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Because defalcation includes breach of fiduciary duty. 
MR. J. THOMSON: Right. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: And the lawyer—we would agree, I assume—has a 
fiduciary duty— 
MR. J. THOMSON: Absolutely. 
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JUDGE BONAPFEL: To the client, to do what client has asked. 
MR. J. THOMSON: There are a broad range of fiduciary duties in this world. 
Just walking around, doing business you create fiduciary duties and you need 
to be attuned to when they are out there. 
MR. R. THOMSON: But those type of fiduciary duties do not stem from 
technical or express trust, and that is what we’re dealing with § 523(a)(4). 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: We hope. 
MR. R. THOMSON: For now, as far as we know. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Well, the question is whether—and I do not think that 
the Eleventh Circuit has told us that you have to have an express trust or a 
technical trust. It has also told us that the lottery situation in Georgia meets 
that. It can be a statutorily-imposed trust, and so, therefore, the question 
becomes whether the obligation of that the lawyer owes to a client is that type 
of fiduciary duty that is an express obligation. 
MR. J. THOMSON: Because you have circuits that are already coming down, 
saying that corporate officers and directors—certainly there is nothing express 
there—that they are hung with a fiduciary duty. And then you get to the big 
question of starting to go down in the weeds and say what kind of act in 
violation of that duty is a defalcation. 
MR. R. THOMSON: Well, and similarly, for innocent mistake or no bad 
intent, let’s take the lottery sales. Suppose the client owns a convenience store. 
He sells state lottery tickets. He gets held up, and cannot recover the tickets or 
the proceeds. Unfortunately, he mailed his insurance premium out a day late by 
mistake. Therefore, that loss wasn’t covered by insurance. Would that be a 
breach of his duty, or a defalcation in his fiduciary responsibilities, such that 
that loss would be nondischargeable? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Let’s take a vote: how my people say yes. How many 
people say no. How many people are asleep? Or don’t care? 
MR. PHILPOT: How many people are judges? 
MR. R. THOMSON: Most people think he ought to be able to discharge it, 
because it hardly seems fair. He got held up. It hardly seems fair. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: The trust law, I submit, would say no. That is a breach 
of fiduciary duty because if you are a fiduciary and you are entrusted with 
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money, make it not the lottery owner but the trustee of an express trust who is 
running a res—real estate—and he collects cash as rent, and on his way to the 
bank, he is held up. 
I think that a classic treatment of trust law would say that the rent is 
property of the trust, and that he has an unqualified obligation to get that 
money, and to account for that money. I think you will find some cases from 
the depression era where a receiver or trustee who put money in a bank that 
failed was liable for the money. Clearly, that is an innocent type of act, but 
there is this liability that you have as a trustee to account for funds that are 
entrusted to you. 
MR. PHILPOT: That kind of liability makes sense. We have doctrines like 
duress and coercion in criminal law that help people out when they are forced 
to do a bad thing, or are put in really tricky situations that are not of their own 
making. Why would that not make sense in a trust context as well, especially 
when we are talking about federal common law, and an exception to 
discharge? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Well, it is not criminal for one thing, so it is a different 
situation. If you are interested in this, you should find the amicus brief written 
on behalf of law professors, in the Bullock case, because this is basically their 
pitch. And their pitch is that in this exception, they would limit it to express 
technical trusts of the type that I just described, which is a trust for a specified 
res, with a named beneficiary. 
That would presumably exclude the malpracticing lawyer, and the 
corporate D&O guy. So that limitation would take all of those cases out of the 
§ 523(a)(4) defalcation problem, because we are only talking about a trust that 
meets those three requirements. 
However, this probably does not help the lottery guy, because there is a 
res—the lottery proceeds—and a designated beneficiary—the lottery 
commission—and that convenience store owner is the trustee. 
MR. R. THOMSON: I think you are forgetting one element of that trust 
relationship. Yes, there has to be a beneficiary, there has to be a trustee, there 
has to be a res. But there is also a requirement that there be specific fiduciary 
responsibilities enumerated. So in the case with my guy—the convenience 
store owner—if he were required to keep insurance in place, then he probably 
had a defalcation. 
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JUDGE BONAPFEL: Right. But the law professors’ argument—and 
someone once said, lawyers look for answers, and law professors look for 
questions—these people may have it right. And we will see whether the 
Supreme Court follows that or some other standard. 
The professors’ concept of § 523(a)(4) is that Congress—almost since 
conception of a dischargeability exception for defalcation, which goes back to 
the 1840 Act—has intended that this statute protect beneficiaries of a trust. 
Period. That’s what defalcation is all about. That’s their argument. 
If you take that argument, and if you apply it only in the express trust area, 
then it says that the level of scienter—or intent or the subjective requirement—
is determined solely by state law or by trust law, because it is to protect the 
beneficiary. 
If the Court were to accept the professors’ argument, then it would seem to 
follow that Mr. Bullock may not prevail because he violated his duty of 
loyalty. One can quibble over whether there really was that much lost, one can 
quibble on the facts, the family situation, or reasonable inferences from the 
facts that we as bankruptcy lawyers might like to invent. 
MR. R. THOMSON: Quarter of a million here, quarter of a million there, all 
of a sudden you’re quibbling about real money. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: It’s real money, right. One can look at the facts of this 
case and imagine all kinds of circumstances on account of which one would 
say, “That’s just not right.” And if one is a bankruptcy judge, one might want 
to say, “I can fix it by saying that it’s not excepted from discharge.” But—and 
here is one of the tensions in this case that, as we know, our Supreme Court 
may find interesting—and that is the federalism aspect of this. And, so, the 
question is, an Illinois court, having resolved this question, and said under 
Illinois law, “These beneficiaries of this trust are entitled to this protection of 
Illinois law of trusts.” How far does the bankruptcy policy go in upsetting that 
and in interfering with that? 
That’s the argument for your adversary. The law professors come down, 
and they say that there is this three-way split. I assume that that is why the 
Supreme Court took this case, because there are three standards that the lower 
courts have applied in determining this defalcation issue. 
The law professors basically say—as law professors sometimes do—that 
none of them are right. This is one way to analyze it. And it could potentially 
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have the effect, it seems to me, of clarifying the issue, first, and, second, 
limiting the scope of § 523(a)(4), because one authority that they rely on is a 
case from 1844, actually, that is the Chapman case.5 This technical express 
trust idea comes from that case. It has been around that long. 
MR. J. THOMSON: If the Supreme Court is willing to do that, that’s great. 
Judge Bonapfel’s job is a little different than mine. My job is to try and give 
him the information so that he can do his job, and to address the issue, give 
him the fair overview of the case law, in particularly as it pertains to the 
position that I am arguing. 
What worries you about the Supreme Court is that the Supreme Court 
could come down with a very narrow definition, making it crystal clear going 
forward. What I think scares me a little bit as a practitioner—just sitting behind 
the desk trying to advocate positions—if the Supreme Court gets too far down 
in the weeds on this and makes what they think is a narrow holding, but they 
believe it with applicable concepts. I go back to a 2004 case that I struggle 
with—Till.6 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Till has nothing to do with dischargeability. But it is a 
bankruptcy case. 
MR. J. THOMSON: But, by analogy, it is a Supreme Court bankruptcy case. 
And it rules on what the appropriate rate of interest is in a plan post-
confirmation? How do you do that? And it was in the context of—I forget the 
exact type automobile, might have been a pickup truck. 
Whatever it was, they came down with a very broad expansive way to 
calculate post-confirmation interest, and the whole time they were looking at 
the pick-up truck, and kind of focusing on the pick-up truck. But at the end it 
becomes a pronouncement. 
Suddenly, I am looking at an office building with a $30 million loan on it, 
and I’m trying to figure out prime plus one. Is that really right? It spawned a 
maelstrom of litigation. It cleared nothing up for me, the commercial lawyer, 
trying to do commercial loans in a chapter 11 post-confirmation context. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: It made life real easy in the consumer context, because 
nobody litigates that anymore. 
 
 5 Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202 (1844). 
 6 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
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MR. J. THOMSON: There you go. And so you hope that when the decision 
in the Bullock case comes down and is issued, that they don’t stay so heavily 
focused on the express trust document and then sort of make a broad 
pronouncement. And then I have corporate officers and directors, and I am 
trying to deal with them, and I am scratching my head saying, “Well, the 
Bullock case, who knows?” That is your fear. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: And they might choose one of the three circuit 
standards. Now you have the prospect of that type of standard applying in all 
types of cases. And now you have the problem of—let’s assume that the 
Supreme Court comes up with a mere negligence standard is enough. Okay? 
The Supreme Court adopts that standard. Innocent mistake? Too bad—it is a 
trust, and you have that obligation. What about our lawyer who fails to record 
the deed? Is that going to be a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
even though it’s an innocent mistake? 
MR. J. THOMSON: Give us a definition. That is what you’re hoping for, is 
that you get some guidance. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: But if you have a Supreme Court case that comes 
down that way—without limiting it—it may take another Supreme Court to get 
the answer to that question. Chapman from 1844 would tell us that the 
malpracticing lawyer is not the type of debt that is within the § 523(a)(4) 
exception. But I think that at least one court, Janikowski, says that it would be 
excepted from discharge.7 
MR. R. THOMSON: But aren’t we really talking about the difference 
between a subjective standard and an objective standard? And if you look at 
the Code section, it differentiates defalcation from fraud, embezzlement, and 
conversion. With fraud, embezzlement and conversion—they all have a 
subjective standard about them, requiring scienter and things of that sort—
intent. 
Whereas defalcation is juxtaposed against those other things, and it would 
imply to me that it is more of an objective standard, and what was objectively 
reasonable with the treatment of the corporate res. And to put the corporate res 
at risk for your own self-dealing does not sound objectively reasonable under 
trust law. 
 
 7 Purcell v. Janikowski (In re Janikowski), 60 B.R. 784 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) 
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JUDGE BONAPFEL: That is what the Eleventh Circuit came up with. The 
argument of the debtor in that regard is that, because § 523(a)(4) has the words 
“fraud,” “embezzlement,” and “larceny” in it—this is the maxim of noscitur a 
sociis—which is, you give more specific meaning and context to a word by 
looking at the words that surround it. In other words, the word is defined by the 
company it keeps. 
So, if you have the words “fraud,” “embezzlement,” “larceny,” which 
imply some sort of wrongdoing, and “defalcation” is thrown in there, then 
Congress must have intended that there be the same type of wrongdoing—
subjective intent—as part of that statute. 
The other argument based on the words of § 523 is, yes, but there are lots 
of other places in § 523(a) defining other debts that are excepted from 
discharge where words like willful or malicious come into play. And so the 
absence of those here really does not mean anything when Congress—and this 
may come down to a plain meaning case, which we also know the Supreme 
Court loves plain meaning, and apply the plain meanings of the words in the 
context of bankruptcy, when a lot of problems are more difficult to solve than 
that. But if it comes down to a plain meaning test, then defalcation is going to 
mean what defalcation means, and the parties in their briefs have cited a 
number of definitions and, once again, going back to the use of the word in 
1840, which will please, I am sure, Justices Scalia and Thomas. But if it comes 
down to that, then defalcation is going to be misappropriation or a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
MR. PHILPOT: Well, that makes sense. It seems that defalcation, not 
specifically in the bankruptcy context, actually goes all the way back to 1705, 
the Defalcation Act of 1705, brought it over from England. And back then, 
defalcation was simply used to refer to situations when you just did not pay 
back the full amount. “Let it be paid without defalcation” meant “Let it be paid 
without any reduction.” So, does it make sense to have it apply to anything 
except financial situations at that point? Because what we have is something 
that was plainly financial in nature all the way back then, and yet the case law, 
over time, has changed this plain meaning. Which plain meaning are we using? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: That is why we have the Supreme Court. I have tried 
to get on it, but nobody will appoint me. 
MR. PHILPOT: Outside of the Code, defalcation does not really appear many 
other places. You do not read it in novels or see it in any other Code context. 
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Does it make sense to have words like this in the Code, or should it just be 
written out? 
MR. J. THOMSON: Whether it makes sense, I am not going opine, but they 
are sprinkled throughout the Code. The Code is full of words that have given 
rise to a lot of litigation. And they’re in there. 
The problem with monkeying with the Code is that Congress seems 
unwilling to ever do it on a piecemeal basis. They do it spurts. They save up 
issues and then they make—whether you want to reefer to them as omnibus—
but they make larger reformations of a number of parts of the Code. The most 
recent one was 2005. 
Maybe this goes in the hopper. Maybe there is a lobby that is willing to get 
behind this and start bringing it to Congress’s attention. The problem is, as we 
know, is that Congress has got a lot bigger fish to fry right now, they have got 
more things on their plate than trying to deal with this one specialized industry. 
If the Supreme Court comes down in a way that creates—hopefully not—
more uncertainty, then maybe this gets on somebody’s radar screen. Maybe 
some, either a banking lobby or some other lobby, starts putting this before 
members of Congress, and it gets to the point of a bill. But I don’t think that 
that is an immediate solution. I think whatever the Supreme Court comes down 
with in Bullock, we are going to be stuck with for a while. 
MR. PHILPOT: I think we will take this opportunity to open it up for 
questions. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Thank you to the panel, it’s been a 
wonderful discussion, I’ve enjoyed it. My name is Michael Wiseman, and I’m 
a second-year student here at Emory. I have one observation and then a 
question about an issue of preclusion. The observation would first be to Mr. 
Thomson’s comment on the no harm no— 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Which Mr. Thomson? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Richard Thomson, yes sir. The no harm, no foul 
argument that I believe it was the Solicitor brought up in his brief. In that brief, 
the Solicitor talks about the other portions of § 523(a)(4), such as 
embezzlement, larceny, and you know, if the loss caused by those actions were 
to be repaid, you’d still be an embezzler or have committed larceny. But the 
distinguishing characteristic is that those two require criminal intent, whereas 
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defalcation, that’s not the standard in all the circuits. So that’s just one 
observation. 
My question has to do with how deep the court wants to get into re-
litigating judgments—because the debt here is a court-imposed judgment. It’s 
unlike the lawyer who failed to file the deed and caused an actual loss. The 
loss here was based on a finding of self-dealing that this person should have, 
what is in effect, a punitive judgment for the benefit that he received. Now, 
Mr. Bullock represented himself— 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: That would not classically be construed by trust law as 
being punitive. It would be restorative by taking back the benefit that the 
debtor got by the improper activity. I understand the point, which is, there had 
not been a loss, so it is really unfair to make him pay it back. But classical trust 
law would not see it that way. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Your Honor. Parts of the law do say that 
disgorgement would be compensatory. But we’ve argued in the merits brief 
that it actually has the effect of a punitive damage. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: It certainly has that effect. It certainly has the effect of 
providing, in a sense, a windfall to the beneficiaries because if the debtor had 
not done this, they would be in exactly the same position they are. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m glad you make that point, Your Honor, because 
that goes to my question about— 
MR. R. THOMSON: Let’s back up for a second. The problem is that you do 
not want to encourage trustees to put the trust property at risk—other people’s 
property at risk—for their own self-dealing. So yes, this time there was a 
benefit to the trust. 
What happens if the market had cratered and his investments all went 
south, and that impacted six hundred thousand dollars, four hundred thousand 
dollars—whatever it was—of the trust property? The reason that they have 
these principles in place and these remedies is to discourage this kind of self-
dealing at the expense of the beneficiaries. Here, it worked out where there was 
no loss. But the public policy should be, “We don’t want you doing this.” “If 
you’re not authorized to that, don’t do it. If you do it, there are ramifications, 
and one of those things is that you’re not going to benefit by your own 
wrongdoings.” 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, that begs the question, sir, about whether this 
was actually self-dealing. And in your example, if the market had cratered, 
then there would be, unlike here, a loss of res. According to the most recent 
restatement of trust, there’s a section, section 603, that says that the trustee’s 
first duty in a revocable inter vivos trust—as this was—is to the settler of the 
trust, not to the beneficiaries. Now, Mr. Bullock represented himself pro se in 
the state court case, so he wasn’t sophisticated enough to bring up this 
argument. So the question of whether this even was a self-dealing— 
MR. R. THOMSON: Let’s back up again. I believe that this was an 
irrevocable trust—at least that was my reading of the brief. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But it may also be applicable in principle to 
irrevocable trusts if they’re inter vivos. And that’s a very new provision that 
has not—it’s a first impression in many circuits. 
MR. R. THOMSON: But we do not know what the trust was. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This goes to my question about issue preclusion, 
because, if that’s the case—that the self-dealing may have been improperly 
decided—how deep is the bankruptcy court willing to go to look at these 
judgments when there’s no actual loss except for that that’s court-imposed? 
Thank you. 
MR. R. THOMSON: Well, how deep does the bankruptcy court want to go? 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Well, you found one of my hobby issues, is issue 
preclusion. That could be the subject of another seminar. The federal rule of—
we have a statute, the full faith and credit statute, which requires a federal 
court to give full faith and credit to a decision of a state court. You have 
§ 523(c), which requires a bankruptcy court to rule on whether a debt is 
excepted from discharge under (a)(2), (4), or (6), and of course, here we have 
(4). So we have an immediate tension as to whether the bankruptcy court can 
go behind that state court judgment on this particular issue. 
MR. J. THOMSON: Because, if I come before you, and I’m bankrupt, and 
I’m suffering—I’ve had a wreck while I was impaired, and I haven’t been to 
trial yet, and I have not been fully adjudicated to be driving under the influence 
at the one time and therefore liable. That case has got to stay open because you 
cannot rule on that. 
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JUDGE BONAPFEL: Oh, I could rule on that. I could determine the 
dischargeability of that debt. Don’t try that at home. But I don’t have to, 
because § 523(c) doesn’t require the bankruptcy court to do so. 
So here we have a case where that fact has not been presented, and it may 
have a determinative effect on the outcome of the case as far as whether there 
was, in fact, a breach of fiduciary duty. So it raises a tough question in the first 
instance, of whether the court can do that. 
The general reaction, I think, of federal courts in this context would be, and 
has been, that he had the chance to establish in the Illinois court whether there 
was a breach of duty—whether there was a breach of the duty of loyalty by 
self-dealing. And he fully litigated. If he did not—if it is a default judgment, 
that raises a whole other set of issues. But here, he actually litigated that issue, 
as far as I know. Maybe it was a default judgment. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It was summary judgment—it wasn’t default. 
JUDGE BONAPFEL: Summary is okay. So he appeared, he defended and the 
Illinois court granted a summary judgment, and so he had the opportunity to 
raise this. He didn’t raise it. So on the issue, if you define the issue as, “Was 
there a breach of loyalty?” That issue is determined. If you follow the law 
professors’ view, which is that § 523(a)(4) is to protect the trust beneficiaries, 
then that would be the end of the discussion. 
I just want to make one observation. Maybe this illustrates the difference. 
Maybe this is why I am not on the Supreme Court. This illustrates the 
difference between a bankruptcy judge’s approach and an appellate court’s 
approach to case. 
After I read this case, and I delved into the briefs a little bit, my question 
was, “Why is this case here?” “Why are you people bothering me with this 
case?” 
Maybe this is directed to the law students mostly, but maybe the lawyers. 
Who is looking after the interests of their clients in this case? Because the 
client is the trust, it has suffered a two hundred and fifty thousand dollars—
plus attorney’s fees—two hundred and eighty five thousand dollar loss. What 
did the trust get from the Illinois court? It got a constructive trust, which is in 
essence, a lien on this debtor’s interest in his company, or maybe on the 
company’s assets. 
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The record is not clear as far as to how much all that is worth. But it 
appears to me, based on, at least, the debtor’s arguments, that if the trust would 
just let him sell his company, he could pay the two hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars. 
The lien does not go away. This is not a question about the lien. Even if 
this debt is discharged, the debt still exists, another little technical point for the 
students and some lawyers. The debt still exists, the personal liability goes 
away. So that means the lien still exists, and that means—notwithstanding the 
automatic stay, notwithstanding the discharge injunction—that they can 
enforce the lien on the assets. 
So why are we arguing about whether this debt is dischargeable, when one 
party apparently has the ability to get the debt paid in a way that the son cannot 
affect through bankruptcy law anyway, and this whole question goes away. 
And we could have gotten to our lunch earlier. 
MR. J. THOMSON: And the last thought that I will leave you with, you 
cannot appreciate it now, but you will see it somewhere. There is a banking 
officer that is reading a report of a bill broken down by tenths of an hour with 
expenses, and I’m scratching my head as to who that banking officer is who 
has let this to go forward, and keeps spending fees on it when he could have 
resolved it by selling the garage construction business three years ago. Who 
knows? You’ll learn more about that. 
MR. PHILPOT: Thank you very much to our panelists. Let’s give them a 
round of applause. 
 
